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Introduction

On the eve of the American Revolution, when representatives from Britain's
thirteen original colonies gathered to discuss the logistics of war and the value of
independence, the newly conquered colony of Quebec stood apart. Isolated
geographically, socially, politically, and religiously, Quebec was an anomaly in that it
enjoyed an unprecedented level of autonomy. When the Quebec Act passed in 1774,
the Quebecois gained even more freedom as they were granted a tremendous amount
of religious tolerance and political jurisdiction. Applied to a culture already accustomed
to a more rugged frontier way of life, such freedom allowed for the Quebecois to remain
extremely politically divided. Under the council of Governor Sir Guy Carleton, members
of Quebec's upper class and clergy confessed their loyalty to British Parliament while
the peasants remained rather indifferent and unaffected. Altogether, unlike their
neighbors to the south, the Quebecois showed relatively little concern over notions such
as taxation without representation.
After the passing of the Quebec Act, the other colonies felt rather ambivalent
towards Quebec. Being the direct benefiters of an act, which was widely held in disdain
by the other colonists, the Quebecois were naturally scrutinized. The Continental
Congress, however, could ill afford to marginalize the Quebecois. With Lake Champlain
proving a veritable super highway from Canada right through the heart of New England
and New York, the Continental Congress was instead forced to sit back and anxiously
await Quebec's political stance. Initially, in a Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec on 24
October 1774, the Continental Congress expressed this anxiety. The Continental
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Congress argued that Parliament was attempting to "confer on one Part the height of
Power and Happiness, and to reduce the other to the extreme of Weakness & Misery"
and that "the intent of good laws, is to oppose this Effort, and to diffuse their Influence,
1

universally & equally." With British Parliament setting a precedent of reversing
decisions pertaining to constitutional rights, the Continental Congress declared no rights
to be "unalienable," and that all was subject to the whims of "Ministers of this flagitious
Temper" who "have dared to violate the most sacred Compacts & obligations."2 The
letter goes on to describe these various constitutional rights, which the Quebecois might
have been ignorant of. The intent of the letter was to win Canadian allegiance for the
coming war.
Throughout the following year, as the situation between Britain and the colonies
became more severe, several more attempts were made to urge the Quebecois to join
in revolt. If nothing else, the goal was to stem a British advance down the Lake
Champlain waterway. When Quebec refused to break neutrality, an invasion army was
sent. After taking the fortifications of Ticonderoga, Saint John, and Montreal, the
American army was ultimately halted at the walls of Quebec City on 31 December 1775.
General Montgomery fell during this hopeless battle, precipitating a high level of
desertion. The city, loosely held under siege by what remained of the colonial army for
five months was ultimately reinforced by the arrival of a British fleet. The invasion would
have been a complete failure, had Benedict Arnold not halted a British counter-invasion
down Lake Champlain just before the waterway froze over for the winter. 3
Over the course of the campaign, the Quebecois responded in a variety of
different ways. There were those who answered Carleton's call by flocking to defend
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the walls of Quebec City. Then, there were those who sympathized with the
Bostonians, and actually fought alongside Arnold and Montgomery against their fellow
countrymen. Many sold their services to the highest bidder, fighting only as hard as
would get them paid. But the vast majority of the Quebecois remained disinterested,
even as the war was brought to their doorsteps. In an attempt to better understand the
Invasion of Canada, the differing viewpoints of the Quebecois colonists require specific
research.
Through the tracing of the origins of the Quebec Act, this paper achieves a
greater acumen of the British conquest of Canada as a whole, revealing the social and
cultural significance that the American Revolution had upon the various Quebecois
classes. Most of the discussion on this topic by scholars of American history focuses on
the stepping-stone mentality of everything as it relates to America achieving its
independence. There is a generous amount of research from scholars of both British
and Canadian history on the subject, unfortunately, this research also becomes
problematic, as it tends to deal mostly with the political perspective of Britain losing the
American Colonies. For instance, renowned Canadian historian Philip Lawson takes
into account the imperialist perspective when he asks, "what effect the conquest of
Quebec had on Britain," and attempts "to treat the debate over Quebec on its own
merits, as contemporaries did." However, while Lawson's historiography proves
priceless to future historians, it speaks mostly to the political historian, leaving the social
historian to find another avenue 4
This paper seeks to give voice to the voiceless by paying particular attention to
the Quebecois citizens as the British conquest and Revolutionary War flipped their lives
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upside down. By examining current historiography and digging through annals of
primary documents, this paper looks to provide a greater understanding of the Canadian
perspective of the American Revolution. To this end, I have employed in detail the
contributions of Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, as their painstaking efforts of
chronicling Canada's history through original documents proves the very foundation of
all scholasticism on the subject. While the documents I employ are written primarily
from the viewpoints of British officials and the merchant class, it is my intention to draw
from them as many different perspectives as possible.
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Chapter 1> "The right Administration of Government in Quebec is a matter of the
greatest lmportance" 5 : Britain's Struggle with the Assimilation of Quebec.

When Quebec was ceded to the British Empire following the Treaty of Paris in
1763, British legislators were faced with a conundrum. An entire colony of French
Catholics needed to be seamlessly worked into an imperial engine that had fervently
disallowed any attachment to the Roman Church. Moreover, the Quebecois colonists
had for the previous century and a half been practicing a feudal style of civil law and
administration completely contrary to the governor/assembly structure implemented by
Britain throughout its North American colonies. The debates in Parliament over how
best to administer government in Quebec spanned several years and encompassed a
raft of conflicting viewpoints. While ultimately in 1774 Britain decided to pass the
Quebec Act and concede to the Quebecois their French civil law and Catholic worship,
the eleven years prior saw Parliament unable to transcend the stigma of legislating for
the benefit of conquered French Catholics. In order to understand how such legislation
impacted the Quebecois' role in the American Revolution, this chapter describes the
political battlefield that was Quebec after the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. In
particular, this chapter explores of the varying classes of Quebecois, to better analyze
the effects of Britain's legislation.
On 5 June 1762, Governor James Murray sent a letter to the King addressing the
state of the government in Quebec. In it, Murray detailed every aspect of the French
civil administration that permeated Quebec prior to British annexation. Having ruled for
the previous two years as the Lieutenant Governor during the military occupation of
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Quebec, Murray's report pointed out corruption and civil injustices, which he attributed
to unchecked abuse of governmental positions. Murray clearly showed early signs of
the salesmanship that would come to characterize his term of office as he explicated the
differences between France's feudal administration, and the British assemblies.
Breaking down the Quebecois social structure, Murray detailed four distinct classes of
French Canadians. Perched at the top of the social hierarchy, Murray claimed was "the
Gentry, or what they call Nobility." Next, he continued with the clergy, followed by "the
Merchants or trading part." Lastly, Murray listed at the bottom of the hierarchy "the
Peasantry or what is here stilled, Habitant." 6
In his analysis of the gentry class, Murray remarked "they are extremely vain
and have an utter contempt for the trading part of the colony, tho' they made no scruple
to engage in it, pretty deeply too, whenever a convenient opportunity served." Through
such correspondence, it became clear from the start that Murray felt no shortage of
prejudice towards the Quebecois upper class. Murray described this upper class as
"great Tyrants to their vassals who seldom met with redress, let their grievances be ever
so just." The gentry, Murray concluded, would "not relish the British Government from
which they can neither expect the same employments or the same douceurs, they
enjoyed under the French." Instead, Murray strategized winning the colony's allegiance
through the other three classes.

7

In contrast to his appraisal of the gentry, Murray's account of the peasantry or
habitants was rather auspicious. Though he initially believed the peasants were
brainwashed into believing the English "were worse than brutes" who "ruled with a rod
of iron," shortly after the conquest Murray found them to be rather open to British
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occupation. Murray described the Quebecois peasants' cohabitation with English
soldiers during the first two years of British rule as "a harmony unexampled even at
home." Through his correspondence, it is clear that Murray felt a deep appreciation for
the Quebecois peasantry. Declaring the peasants to be "virtuous in their morals and
temperate in their living," Murray set a precedent of Quebecois sympathy, which can be
interpreted as the impetus of the Quebec Act. Murray went so far as to state that if "the
free exercise of their religion will be continued to them once Canada is irrecoverably
ceded by a Peace the people will soon become faithful and good subjects to His
Majesty." It was Murray's belief that Quebec's potential worth lied in the hidden value of
its peasantry. 8
Quebec, as a colony was as disparate to Britain's other North American holdings
as France was to England. To truly appreciate the difference between the colonies, one
must understand the dissimilarities of their mother countries. In Quebec's case, before
British conquest the government was mirrored on the feudal system of France,
however, there were some distinct differences. Unlike France's ancient lineage of noble
appointments, the various administrative offices held in New France were merit-based,
and subject only to the King's approval, which worked ideally to ensure virtue and
efficiency. As can be imagined, the subjectivity of such appointments seldom led to
ideal officers.
With New France being markedly different than Old France, a greater sense of
freedom existed for the habitants. Quebec's peasant-class was comprised of colonists,
who in the mother country held barely enough land to provide subsistence. Once
transplanted to Quebec, the habitants were able to lease plots of over a hundred acres,
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almost ten times larger than their holdings in France. The habitants also enjoyed
certain privileges such as hunting and fishing, both illegal to peasants back in France.
Such freedom provided greater financial opportunity to the habitants of Quebec than
ever could be imagined in France. Seigniorial rent was modest, taxes light, and church
tithes were greatly subsidized by the crown as incentive to keep the colony stable. 9
Though the habitants proved the crucial cog to the Canadian cause long before
Murray was able to praise their merit, there simply were not enough of them for New
France to compete with British interests. By 1660, Quebec had held a population of just
over three thousand, compared to the 58,000 English colonists who stretched from New
England down to the Chesapeake. From its inception to the end of the seventeenth
century, New France had expanded but not nearly at the rate the French crown would
have liked. The difficulty for France in emulating Britain's colonial immigration success
lied in a lack of French interest in trans-Atlantic passage. Due to the enclosure
movement, which resulted in a monstrous rate of homelessness, Britain had no
problems enticing impoverished and destitute subjects to gamble on a fresh start in the
New World. Not being faced with the same unemployment dilemma, France needed to
be much more creative with its incentive programs. As a stimulus, the French offered
seigniorial fiefs to those who could transport their own settlers. Soon, a very
unorthodox version of French feudalism predominated the social structure of New
France. Initially based on a military design, the bureaucratic system of New France
soon seemed just as efficient than that of the British colonies. 10
Based on the functioning bureaucracy of England, the governmental structure of
the British colonies also featured several key distinctions. Like in England, no
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seigniorial system existed in the British colonies. Rather, based on the marriage of
Parliament to the king, the British colonies enjoyed a three-tiered governmental system.
Directly representing the king was the royally appointed colonial governor, whose job it
was to protect the interests of British royal policy, and to ensure the colonies met their
end of the mercantile agreement. Mirroring Parliament were the assemblies, elected by
the people to provide representation for the people.
There was a marked difference between the Parliament of England and the
colonial assemblies. Because the colonies were clearly devoid of nobility, there was no
need for a House of Lords. This lack of nobility throughout the 1600's allowed for the
English colonists to mostly rule themselves, which provided the wealthiest of merchants
the most power. Royally appointed governors technically had the last say in all matters,
but feisty colonists constantly threatened rebellion if the governors challenged elected
assemblies. As a check on the assemblies, and to further ensure the governors were
not completely out-numbered, there was the governor's council, consisting of members
appointed by the governor himself. The council generally handled matters of judicial
nature, but also frequently managed to rouse public attention, and provided the basis for
political parties in the New World. With the seigniorial system in New France leaving no
room for a powerful merchant class, the French nobility in Quebec dominated all
aspects of civil administration.

11

The British colonies may have dwarfed New France in terms of population, but
British geographical advances were constantly stymied by France's claim on the
Mississippi River. Territory disputes frequently resulted in the form of four different
French and Indian Wars. As thriving British colonies desired to push westward,

Luedtke 11

France's claim on the interior of North America was constantly challenged. With but a
fraction of Britain's colonial population, New France was able to hold the Mississippi for
over a century and a half. Finally, during the fourth French and Indian War, while
France was preoccupied in Europe by the Prussian army, England managed to wholly
dedicate itself to the conquering of North America. Britain ultimately overwhelmed New
France and the result was the capitulation of Quebec in 1759.
After the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, to the astonishment of many
(especially the inhabitants of Quebec), France ceded Quebec in order to hold on to its
islands in the West lndes. France was done fighting over a colony that offered little
profit and a great deal of conflict. The Canadians became British subjects, but with the
prejudices that came with being Roman Catholic. Any Canadian not wishing to be ruled
by the British Empire was free to return to France, but few could afford it. Only 270 left
the colony. As far as the British were concerned, Quebec was to be considered an
investment. The Citizens in London scoured the newspapers for investment information
dealing with the mercantile trade in Quebec, and the colony's economic speculation
played a great role in the passing of early legislation. Many in London demanded as
much information about Canada and its inhabitants as could be obtained. After all, the
conquered colony was already established, all that was needed was a new direction. 12
In his own letter to the King on the state of the government in 1762, Ralph
Burton, Lt. Governor of Trois-Rivieres nearly echoed Governor Murray's opinion by
praising the habitants. By stating, "the King's Rights and Privileges, as every other
Branch of the Ancient Administration, has been the most powerful means of stopping
the progress of this Colony," 13 Burton's opined French Canada could be administered
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efficiently once the seigniorial system was removed. Burton went so far as to suppose
that the gentry were "the only People, who may perhaps Intend to Remove, if the
Country should Remain under the Government of Great Britain." He further declared
"they Chuse not to Speak upon the Subject, as they still flatter themselves with tacit &
Distant hopes of the Country being Returned to its former Masters." The prevailing
sentiment among Quebec's various governors shortly after the conquest was that the
gentry needed replacing, while the habitants were the key to colonial success. 14
In order to win over the French civil bureaucracy without alienating the habitants,
Quebec's British governors realized the value of the Catholic clergy. Murray,
specifically emphasized the importance of French priests and bishops; he suggested to
the King "for the sake of keeping them in proper subjection, to nominate them himself or
by those who act under his authority."15 It was his notion that the Quebecois clergy was
directly tied to the French civil administration, and that by emulating Quebec's design,
rather than by forbidding Catholic practice, allegiance would be automatic. Being that
the Arlicles of Capitulation signed on 8 September 1760 stated the Canadians were free
to exercise their worship in the Catholic faith, Murray and the other governors
anticipated a peaceable alliance with the clergy. 16
Despite the wording of the Arlicles of Capitulation, and regardless of
correspondence from the governors, British Parliament hesitated to guarantee any
amount of religious tolerance to the Quebecois. This is mostly due to the fact that the
Treaty of Paris, signed in 1763 renegotiated the terms set by the Arlicles of Capitulation.
While the treaty did offer some religious guarantees of its own, the updated wording
was rather ambiguous. Parliament, clinging to the treaty's ambiguity, was able to justify
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legally its denial of the Quebecois' civil law and Catholic worship. After the treaty was
signed, Parliament hurried through the Royal Proclamation of 1763, a piece of
legislation described by Canadian historian Fernand Oullette as "far too opposed to
reality to withstand the test of time." 17
While the French Canadian gentry, clergy, and trading classes fought for a place
within the British imperial system, Governor Murray struggled with the changing of
regimes in Parliament. Labeled as a minority sympathizer, Murray was disliked by a
great many in London. During his administration, the prevailing thought in England was
that Quebecois society could be "molded into a mirror image of Britain." 18 Murray
understood differently. He conveyed in a letter to the Lords of Trade that while "nothing
will satisfy the Licentious Fanaticks trading here, but the expulsion of the Canadians
who are perhaps the bravest and the best race upon the Globe,"19 the Canadians,
"cou'd they be indulged with a few priveledges" could "become the most faithful and
most useful set of Men in this American Empire." With boasts like this, there could be
no doubt as to Murray's political stance on the Quebecois. Regardless of the raft of
optimistic reports on Canada's future sent by Murray, Gage, and Burton, the opinions
swirling around London were that Quebec had been a failure of a colony under French
rule, and unless every aspect of the old administration was inundated with the proven
British model, it held at best a blinkered future. 20
Such was the case in the mid 1760's when policy makers such as the Earl of
Shelburne sought to incorporate the French Canadians, while others argued for the
arrant abolition of Catholic worship in Canada. Shelburne's thinking was to avoid the
possibility of a French Canadian uprising by disconnecting the Quebecois from their
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reliance upon the French Catholic hierarchy without forbidding them their sacred
practices. In doing so, Shelburne, like Murray proposed to create a new hierarchy in the
Canadian bishopric, one that would be subject to the jurisdiction of the King. Shelburne
argued, "that the Influence of Religion or rather Superstition is confined to a certain
latitude, and that Nothing is to be feared from its effects in America."21 The Quebecois
were continually reported to be nothing if not submissive to British rule, especially while
under the impression their Catholic faith was to be tolerated. Though seemingly as
close of a sympathizer in London as Murray could get, even Shelburne's avowal would
prove inadequate. As Shelburne argued for the incorporation of the Catholic
Quebecois, most of the British who travelled to Quebec for political power chose instead
to enact exclusion ism.
While Murray certainly had his hands full in dealing with how to govern the
conquered Quebecois political system, he found added pressure from the arrival of a
fifth class of Quebec citizen: the English merchants. As the pre-conquest French
merchants navigated the new administration with difficulty, they were eventually able to
increase in strength and influence. A French Canadian elite began to arise through a
Darwinistic elimination of the weakest elements. However, no matter how adaptable
certain French merchants proved to be, they always held the distinct disadvantage of
not being English. This played a gigantic role in most of the legislation that was passed
in the early years of the conquest. English merchants flocked into the newly acquired
colony like sharks that smelled blood in the water. All early indications were that
Parliament was going to legislate under the notion that French Catholics could only ever
maintain a second-hand citizenship with little rights, and no governing capacity. These
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indications were of course true, but only to a certain extent. Sympathetic governors
continued to fight for the rights of the Canadian, even when it spelled political suicide 22
Murray lost almost all support from the Board of Trade in July of 1765 when his
most powerful ally, Prime Minister Grenville was dismissed from office and replaced by
the unsympathetic Marquis of Rockingham. The two years preceding the ministerial
change saw Murray's position on the rights of the French Canadians come under fire.
Despite Murray's support from the people of Quebec, within a mere two months, the
new ministry had already taken action upon him. In a letter to the King on the handling
of the "ecclesiastical affairs" of Quebec, the Board of Trade recommended Murray be
removed from office and directed to return to England to stand trial. In Murray's
absence, the Board of Trade suggested a temporary Lieutenant Governor administer
the colony's governance. 23
Murray was officially called to England to answer for charges by English
merchants in Quebec of favoring the interests of the French Canadian citizens. In
Murray's absence, the Quebecois sent petitions to the King in supplication of his return.
The seigneurs of Montreal thanked the King "for having given them as Governor, the
honourable James Murray." 24 They went on to ask of the King to "graciously continue to
them this Worthy Governor whose clearsightedness, Equity and wisdom continually
afford him efficacious means for maintaining the people in tranquility and obedience."
Despite such petitions, Murray was not reinstated, and Sir Guy Carleton was named the
new Lieutenant Governor of Quebec. With this changing of the guard, a new era fell
upon the colony. Sent in by the Board of Trade as a replacement for Murray, Carleton's
primary duty was to calm the tensions between the original French inhabitants and the
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empowered British merchants. Little could the Board of Trade realize at the time,
Carleton's administration would favor the French Canadians' interests just as much as
his predecessor Murray's.

25

In June of 1766, Lord Northington drafted a set of instructions for Governor
Carleton concerning the rights of the Quebecois, which would have reinstituted a form
of French civil law. The instructions stated the Royal Proclamation never intended to
"abrogate the Jaws and customs of Canada in matters of tenure, or the succession and
alienation of real and personal estates."

26

The draft goes on to direct the governor to

"issue a proc/amation ... explanatory of this our royal intention, in order to quiet the minds
of our good subjects in respect of their local customs and usages." Though they
provided no allowances for the tolerance of the Catholic religion, these instructions
would have been groundbreaking in their legal concessions. Unfortunately for the
Quebecois, these instructions were never officially sent to Carleton, instead the debate
over French Canadian legal rights raged on in London. Neatby attributes this stunted
legislation to the lobbying of the British merchants in Parliament. 27
In any case, Governor Carleton found himself forced to pick up where Murray left
off, in the midst of a people with no legal right to its own judicial system. At the time,
French civil law was not the only hot topic of debate in Quebec. The Royal
Proclamation of 1763 clearly stated the Canadian government was to erect an elected
assembly. Since the English merchants were primed to be the only beneficiaries of this
model, both Murray and Carleton fought fervently for Parliament to reconsider the
judicial and legislative rights of the Quebecois.
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Chapter 2> "A just and humane piece of legislation" 28 : Governor Carleton and the
Passing of the Quebec Act

Scholars of American history traditionally view the Quebec Act as the "attack on
Protestantism"29 that helped to provoke the American colonists into revolt. Why
wouldn't they? Contemporaries of the Quebec Act tended to lump it in with the other
"intolerable" or "coercive" acts, assuming its sole purpose was to punish the New
Englanders for their obstinacy. The Continental Congress responded to the Quebec
Act's legalization of Catholicism by clearly resolving, "as men and Protestant Christians,
we are indispensubly obliged to take all proper measures for our security." 30 While it is
not altogether uncommon for the American scholar to view the Quebec Act as a
stepping-stone to the American Revolution, the act is done a great injustice when it is
not also interpreted from a Canadian perspective. The Quebec Act ensured for the
Quebecois people the freedom to practice their Catholic faith, restored to them their
French civil law, extended the boundaries of Quebec to encompass a tremendous
amount of territory previously ceded to the Native American peoples as a reservation,
freed the Quebecois from the traditional oath of allegiance, which required the
renunciation of Catholic beliefs in order to be granted all the rights and privileges of
British subjects, and lastly established a government structure for the Quebecois devoid
of the general assembly that was promised by the English constitution. While it is true
the Quebec Act infuriated a great many British subjects both in London and in North
America, the true impetus of the act was the fair and equal treatment of the inhabitants
of Quebec.
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In furthering the overall understanding of British imperialism's role on the
Quebecois involvement in the American Revolution, this chapter specifically analyzes
the Quebec Act's wide-ranging effect on the Quebecois social classes, particularly the
nobility and merchants. While Canadian historians such as Hilda Neatby and Fernand
Oullet choose to focus on the Quebec Act from a political perspective, usually as a
precursor to the Canadian Constitution, they wind up providing relatively little analysis of
the act's cultural implications. In an attempt to step beyond the current historiography,
this chapter analyzes the various social issues that surrounded Quebec from the time of
British conquest in 1760 up to the passing of the Quebec Act. At the heart of these
social issues lied the tension between Quebec's French Seigniors and the growing
British merchant class. This tension is neatly evidenced through various petitions to the
King by both parties, as well as by Carleton's continued correspondence to London.
Through the examining of these sources, particularly in regards to the legislation that
led up to the passing of the Quebec Act, it is my intention to chart the changes in
perspective on the governmental situation in Quebec beginning with the Royal
Proclamation of 1763.
It is easy for historians to gloss over the Royal Proclamation as it pertains to the
governing of Quebec. Historians such as W. J. Eccles have interpreted it as the
document that "sought to avert the outbreak of hostilities between the Indians and the
Americans bent on driving them off their lands by any means." 31 Certainly, the Royal
Proclamation was greatly concerned with relations between the colonists and the
Indians, as it was hurried through Parliament in response to Pontiac's Rebellion.
However, regardless of Britain's response to Indian rebellion, the Royal Proclamation
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was also the document responsible for establishing the parameters for the governing of
the newly acquired Quebec.
Leading to the eventual passing of the Quebec Act, the Royal Proclamation set
the political stage in Quebec by effectively instituting British civil law and establishing
the governor, council and assembly infrastructure as was practiced by the other North
American colonies. It states "express Power and Direction" be given to the "Governors
of our Said Colonies respectively," with directions for these governors "with the Advice
and Consent of the Members of our Council" to "summon and call General Assemblies
within the said Governments respectively." While the Royal Proclamation called for
Quebec's government to be "as near as may be agreeable to the Laws of England, and
under such Regulations and Restrictions as are used in other Colonies," it did offer the
clause that "until such Assemblies can be called as aforesaid, all Persons Inhabiting in
or resorting to our Said Colonies may confide in our Royal Protection for the Enjoyment
of the Benefit of the Laws of our Realm of England." The importance of these
instructions echoed over the next eleven years, as Quebec's Governors, Murray and
Carleton both refused to call assemblies. 32
The administration of the British North American colonies was logically based
upon the Parliamentary structure outlined in the English constitution. This structure
called for a governor as a direct representative of the king, the governor's council to aid
him in legislation, and a general assembly to represent the colonists. For Quebec, the
original proposal for the Royal Proclamation drafted by Under Secretary of State for the
Colonies John Pownall omitted the assembly altogether. Pownall stated the Quebecois
were "under a legal disability of being admitted efficient members of the community so
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as to act in any judicial or legislative capacity." In essence, astute politicians such as
Pownall realized the incompatibility of an assembly-based government in Quebec based
on the Quebecois' republican inexperience. However, the notion of a government in
Quebec devoid of an assembly struck panic and anger in the hearts of British legislators
and merchants, and the Quebecois, having had no conception of representative
government showed little interest in an assembly anyway. Such being the case, it came
as no surprise when Parliament disregarded Pownall's advice, and chose instead to
insert the assembly. 33
The decision to include an assembly in Quebec's government would eventually
become a key step towards the subjugating of the French Canadians, but only because
of the oaths associated with the Test Acts. Dating as far back as the Reformation, the
Test Acts were created to penalize recusants (those who refused to attend the Anglican
Church). The acts required oaths of declaration and allegiance by all who were to hold
office in Britain's government and courts. The acts were directed primarily toward
Catholics in response to the paranoia caused by the actions of James I and Charles I.
With such an anti-Catholic hysteria prevailing in England in the late seventeenth
century, oaths swearing against Catholic beliefs became universally accepted in
England.
In 1763, when the Royal Proclamation successfully established Quebec as a
British colony, Quebec's first Governor, James Murray received a set of instructions,
which accompanied his commission. Both documents worked together to lay out in
specific detail how Quebec was to be governed. In his commission, Murray was
directed to administer "to all and every such person and persons as you shall think fit,
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who shall at any time or times pass into our said Province or shall be resident or abiding
there" a Declaration against Popery as outlined in An Act for preventing Dangers which
may happen from Popish Recusants. 34 The act called for takers of the oath to declare
"that there is not any Transubstantiation in the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, or in the
Elements of Bread and Wine, at, or after the Consecration thereof by any person
whatsoever," in essence swearing a disbelief in the Catholic faith. The act stipulated
that "all and every the person or persons aforesaid that doe or shall neglect or refuse to
take the said Oathes" would be ineligible "to have occupy or enjoy the said Office or
Offices lmployment or lmployments" of British government. 35
The second oath called for in Murray's commission was taken from An Act for the
further Security of His Majesties Person and the Succession of the Crown in the
Protestant Line and for extinguishing the Hopes of the pretended Prince of Wales and
all other Pretenders and their open and secret Abettors. This oath declared the taker's
sworn allegiance to the protestant line of succession, and renounced James Stuart, "the
Old Pretender" as the "Person [who] pretended to be Prince of Wales during the Life of
the late King James and since his Decease." This act also called for a
similar "incapacity of office" by any who refused to take the oath. It stated any who
abstain from the oath be "adjudged incapable and disabled in Law to all Intents and
Purposes whatsoever to have occupy or enjoy the said Office or Offices lmployment or
lmployments."36
In effect, while the Royal Proclamation promised representative government for
the Quebecois, it was obvious no true representation would exist. Murray's commission
explicitly stated the assembly members "duly Elected by the Major Part of the
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Freeholders of the respective parishes, or precincts ... shall before their sitting take the
oath mentioned in the said act.. .as also make and subscribe the forementioned
declaration." Thankfully for the Quebecois, Murray acknowledged the subjugation such
an assembly would create. He was therefore able to circumvent his order to call an
assembly due to the clause in his commission, which allowed him to "call General
Assemblies of the Freeholders and Planters, within your Government, in such; manner
as you in your Direction shall judge most proper." Murray took full advantage of his
governor's discretion despite constant appeals from British merchants. 37
In 1764, the first year of civil government in Quebec, an idea that permeated in
Parliament was that Quebecois society could be molded "into a near image of that of
Britain." While the legislators in London built up unrealistic expectations for the
conversion of Quebecois society, Murray was left to deal with the reality; "stipulations
governing the practice of the Catholic faith and law" 38 left the majority of Quebecois
without a political voice. As this opened the door for power-hungry protestant
merchants immigrating from Britain and the other colonies, Murray ardently defended
the French Catholics at every turn. Arguing on behalf of the Quebecois, Murray
constantly urged Parliament to make exceptions. In 1764 Murray stated, "I cannot be
the instrument of destroying, perhaps the best and bravest race on the globe, a race,
that have already got the better of every national antipathy to their conquerors."39
Murray did have his own ideas on how best to handle the religious conundrum in
Quebec. In his initial report on the state of Quebec on 5 June 1762, Murray urged the
King to maintain the existing French Bishopric. Murray suggested to the king "for the
sake of keeping them in proper subjection, to nominate them himself or by those who
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act under his authority." 40 It was Murray's contention that the French Bishopric, being
closely tied to the civil administration under the French regime ruled over the Quebecois
clergy in a very effective manner. Murray argued Quebecois allegiance would be
automatic if the English simply emulated the French model in Quebec.
Murray had good reason to challenge his instructions in regards to religious
toleration. The Articles of Capitulation clearly allowed for Catholic worship, stating the
"free exercise of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Religion, shall subsist entire."41
The Treaty of Paris, on the other hand included an escape clause. The treaty reads,
"his new Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion according to
the rites of the Rom ish church," but only "as far as the laws of Great Britain permit."42 In
1763, with the passing of the Royal Proclamation, Murray was forced to watch with
skepticism as the promise of freedom offered to the Quebecois was officially revoked.
In a letter written by the Earl of Egremont, Secretary of the Southern Department just
prior to the passing of the Royal Proclamation, Murray's fears were confirmed. That the
king had established a religious tolerance in the Articles of Capitulation was
acknowledged, however, Egremont cautioned the laws of Great Britain "prohibit
absolutely all Popish Hierarchy in any of the Dominions belonging to the Crown of Great
Britain, and can only admit a Toleration of the Exercise of that Religion."43
Parliament's strict anti-Catholic legislature is aptly evidenced in the case of
Quebec's courts. The proclamation ordered "Courts of Judicature and public Justice as
may be agreeable to the Laws of England" 44 to be erected for the first year of English
civil rule. However, Murray continued to allow the French Canadians to practice law in
their own language and custom. Murray believed the Canadians could be slowly
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converted from Catholicism and the political ignorance of their feudal heritage, and
shaped into a legitimate British colony. Murray's concession that English civil law would
eventually prevail in Quebec was of little consolation to the merchants in Quebec or the
members of Parliament.
Trying to appease both sides, Murray penned his Ordinance establishing civil
courts on 17 September 1764 in which he finally established English civil courts in
Quebec. The ordinance refused the Quebecois their feudal civil law, but it did include
modifications, which altered the traditional British court schema, evidencing an astute
awareness of Quebec's unique situation. Chief among these modifications was a
clause, which established "an inferior Court of Judicature, or Court of Common Pleas"45
where Catholics would not be excluded, as well as a proposal "to allow Canadian
advocates and proctors to practice in this court." 46 Through his ordinance, Murray
clearly tried to find a compromise, which could appease all sides. Unfortunately, as is
illustrated by countless petitions to London, the English merchant class in Quebec
would settle for nothing less than the general assembly that was promised.
By the time Murray's ordinance took effect, a rift had already existed in Quebec
between the French Seigniors and the recently emigrated British merchants. The
Seigniors clung to their noble status and social entitlement, while the British merchants
sought a complete overhaul of the political hierarchy in Quebec. The tension was only
exasperated by the power imbalance that the newly formed, anti-Catholic government
created. 47 In a petition to the King, a group of British merchants accused Murray of
favoring the French Quebecois over His "Majesty's most faithful and loyal subjects,
British Merchants and Traders." The petition stated, "The Governor instead of acting
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agreeable to that confidence reposed in him by your Majesty, in giving a favorable
Reception to those of your Majesty's Subjects, who petition and apply to him on such
important Occasions as require it," responds with "a Rage and Rudeness of Language
and Demeanor, as dishonorable to the Trust he holds of your Majesty as painful to
those who suffer from it." The petition continued by accusing Murray of displaying "most
flagrant Partialities" such as "taking measures to keep your Majesty's old and new
Subjects divided from one another, by encouraging the latter to apply for Judges of their
own National Language." The merchants finished by stipulating Murray has made "your
Majesty's loyal British Subjects, in the Province so very unhappy that we must be under
the Necessity of removing from it, unless timely prevented by a Removal of the present
Governor."48
Responding to the British merchants' position, several of the French Seigniors
penned an Address of the Principal inhabitants of Canada to the King, Relative to the
Establishment of Courts of Justice, and the Presentment of the Grand Jury on 7
January 1765. Under the guidelines of the administration set forth by the Royal
Proclamation, French Canadians were ineligible to serve on a jury so long as they
practiced the Catholic faith. This address begged the King to recognize such a
discrepancy and reconsider the courts of justice, which were comprised of English
jurors representing "about thirty English Merchants, of whom fifteen at the most, are
settled here," while the French Canadians were "ten thousand Heads of Families who
feel nothing but submission to the orders of Your Majesty." The address began by
asserting, "the true Glory of a Victorious King consists in assuring to the vanquished the
same happiness and the same tranquility in their Religion" that existed prior to their
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defeat. The major concern was the practice of exclusionary representation based upon
religious faith or practice. That the English jurors were not "submissive to the wise
decisions of the Governor and his Council" was the Quebecois' primary subject of
discontent. By illustrating their conformity to the Governor's rule, the plan of the French
Seigniors was to appear docile and willing subjects to the King. The Seigniors
maintained English Merchants displayed no respect for the law or the administration,
and showed interest only in capitalizing on the disproportion of power. 49
Debate raged in London through the mid 1760's over whether or not to
incorporate French Catholics in the government of Quebec. By claiming the French
Quebecois, "cou'd they be indulged with a few priveledges" might "become the most
faithful and most useful set of Men in this American Empire," 5° Murray's political stance
left room for little doubt. Initially, Murray seemed to have an ally in the Earl of
Shelburne, who while serving as president of the Board of Trade argued for a British
control over rather than abolition of the Catholic institution in Quebec. Shelburne, like
Murray believed the incorporation of the Catholic Quebecois was the key to successful
administration in the colony. Shelburne maintained, "the Influence of Religion or rather
Superstition is confined to a certain latitude, and that Nothing is to be feared from its
effects in Arnerica." 51 The Quebecois were continually reported to be nothing if not
submissive to British rule, especially while under the impression their Catholic faith was
to be tolerated. Shelburne seemed as close a sympathizer in London as Murray could
get. However, even his avowal would prove inadequate. As Shelburne argued for the
incorporation of the Catholic Quebecois, most of the British who travelled to Quebec for
political power chose instead to enact exclusionism.
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Murray lost almost all support from the Board of Trade in July of 1765 when his
most powerful ally, Prime Minister Grenville was dismissed from office and replaced by
the unsympathetic Marquis of Rockingham. The two years preceding the ministerial
change saw Murray's position on the rights of the French Canadians come constantly
under fire. Despite Murray's support from the people of Quebec, within a mere two
months, the new ministry had already taken action upon him. In a letter to the King on
the handling of the "ecclesiastical affairs" of Quebec, the Board of Trade stated of
Murray "that we are humbly of Opinion ... that... Your Majesty's Governor ... return to
this Kingdom ... and that in the mean time a proper person should be authorized to
administer Government there." 52
Murray was officially called to England to answer for charges by English
merchants in Quebec of favoring the interests of the French Canadians. In Murray's
absence, the Qw§becois sent petitions to the King in supplication of his return. The
seigneurs of Montreal thanked the King "for having given them as Governor, the
honourable James Murray."
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They went on to ask the King to "graciously continue to

them this Worthy Governor whose clearsightedness, Equity and wisdom continually
afford him efficacious means for maintaining the people in tranquility and obedience."
Despite such petitions, Murray was not reinstated, and Sir Guy Carleton was named the
new Lieutenant Governor of Quebec. With this changing of the guard, a new era fell
upon the colony. Sent in by the Board of Trade as a replacement for Murray, Carleton's
primary duty was to calm the tensions between the original French inhabitants and the
empowered British merchants.

54
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In June of 1766, Lord Chancellor Robert Henry, the Earl of Northington drafted a
set of instructions for Governor Carleton concerning the rights of the Quebecois, which
would have reinstituted a form of French civil law. The instructions stated the Royal
Proclamation never intended to "abrogate the laws and customs of Canada in matters of
tenure, or the succession and alienation of real and personal estates." 55 The draft went
on to direct the governor to "issue a proclamation ... explanatory of this our royal
intention, in order to quiet the minds of our good subjects in respect of their local
customs and usages." Though they provided no allowances for the tolerance of the
Catholic religion, these instructions would have been groundbreaking in their legal
concessions. Unfortunately for the Quebecois, Northington's instructions were never
officially sent to Carleton, instead the debate over French Canadian legal rights
continued in London. Due mostly to the lobbying of the British merchants, this stunted
legislation proved Parliament was not yet ready to act against its own racial bias. 56
With the ascension of Guy Carleton, optimism abounded among the British
merchants in Quebec. Believing Parliament responded by replacing the obstinate
Murray with a more favorable candidate, the merchants could not have predicted
Carleton's political response. In fact, Carleton's specific orders were to find a
compromise that could peaceably unite the French and British interests in Quebec. In
June of 1767, Shelburne declared to Carleton in a letter "the right Administration of
Government in Quebec is a matter of the greatest Importance." Carleton was asked to
produce "every Information which can tend to elucidate how far it is practicable and
Expedient to blend the English with the French Laws in order to for His Majesty's Old
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and New Subjects, in order to the whole being confirmed & finally established by
Authority of Parliament. "57
Like Murray before him, Carleton understood the complexities involved with the
governing of a French majority. Carleton also realized there was not enough interest in
Canada to encourage proper British immigration. In a response to Shelburne in 1767,
Carleton stated, "there is not the least Probability, this present Superiority should ever
diminish," Carleton declared that "on the contrary 'tis more than probable it will increase
and strengthen daily."58 Carleton's argument was based on the spreading throughout
England of the notion that Canada was a frigid wasteland, along with the fact that the
Quebecois people naturally increased at an astonishing rate. With the unlikeliness that
British subjects would ever outnumber the French in Quebec, Carleton saw no
alternative to the reinstating of French civil law.
Carleton held no hope of a true representative government in Quebec. The
English civil law and assembly structures that were so effective in the other British
colonies would only work to subjugate an entire race of people. Carleton openly
declared English law in Quebec as incompatible in a letter to the Earl of Shelburne by
stating, "that it cannot long remain in Force, without a General Confusion and
Discontent." He went on to suggest a repeal of the "Ordinance [of 1ih Sept. 1764] ...
and for the present leave the Canadian Laws almost entire." Carleton intimated timing
was the key issue with the Quebecois, and that rather than overhauling the entire
French feudal governmental system, slight "Alterations might be made in the old and
those new Laws Judged necessary." Carleton's alternative suggestion called for such

Luedtke 30

alterations to be published "as a Canadian Code, as was practiced by Edward the First
after the Conquest of Wales. "59
Having efficiently picked up where Murray left off on the debate over Quebec's
government, Carleton pushed even harder against the British merchants. Carleton
called for the reinstatement of the pre-British conquest Seigniorial system of
government. In a Jetter to Shelburne on 24 December 1767, Carleton wrote "This
System of Laws established Subordination, from the first to the lowest, which preserved
the internal Harmony, they enjoyed until our Arrival, and secured Obedience to the
Supreme Seat of Government from a very distant Province." Carleton argued that the
Proclamation of 1763 completely overturned this very effective mode of governing the
Quebecois, and introduced instead "A Sort of Severity, if I remember right, never before
practiced by an Conqueror, even where the People, without Capitulation, submitted to
His Will and Discretion." 60
Because the French feudal system contained absolutely no form of republican
representation, British merchants' continually pleaded for the promised assembly. In a
Jetter to Shelburne on 25 November 1767, Carleton maintained Quebec will "to the end
of Time, be peopled by the Canadian Race, who already have taken such firm
Root ... that any new Stock transplanted will be totally hid, and imperceptible amongst
them." 61 Carleton used this logic to strengthen his stance, stating "the better Sort of
Canadians fear nothing more than popular Assemblies, which, they conceive, tend only
to render the People refractory and insolent." The French held no hope at
representation under the Test Acts, and the British Jaw gave all power to the minority.
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By 1768, Carleton had hoped that finally the British merchants were relenting in
their requests for an assembly. In a letter to Shelburne, he stated "I imagined, they had
laid aside all Thoughts of the Kind, till lately one John McCord," a local merchant "who
wants neither Sense or Honesty," started an uprising. Carleton described McCord as
disgruntled, having opened up sheds near the barracks, where he "placed poor People
to sell his Spirits to the Soldiers." When McCord's profits were "checked, by inclosing
the Barracks to prevent the Soldiers getting drunk all Hours of the Day and Night," he
"commenced Patriot, and with the Assistance of the late Attorney General, and three or
four more, egged on by Letters from Home, are at work again for an Assembly." 62
Carleton's disdain for British merchants such as McCord appears later in the letter when
he asserted "It may not be improper here to observe, that the British Form of
Government, transplanted into this Continent, never will produce the same Fruits as at
Home, chiefly, because it is impossible for the Dignity of the Throne, or Peerage to be
represented in the American Forests." It was Carleton's conclusion that the French
Seigniors were the closest thing to an honorable class of people that would ever inhabit
Canada; therefore they should be accommodated, not submitted to the will of the
merchants, whom Carleton loathed.
Like Murray before him, Carleton refused to call an assembly, and like Murray,
he was repeatedly petitioned. By 1770, the English merchants in Quebec were
beginning to grow desperate. In a petition, the merchants contended they were the
economic backbone of Quebec, claiming to "carry on three fourths of the Trade of this
Country." The merchants continued by warning the king that "if a General Assembly is
not soon order'd by Your Majesty ... Your Petitioners have the greatest reason to
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apprehend their own ruin as well as that of the Province in general." The merchants
asserted that with no assembly, the colony could not properly "make and enforce due
obedience to Laws for encouraging Agriculture, regulating Trade," and "discouraging
such Importations from the other Colonies as impoverish the Province." 63 Should the
king not force the governor's hand, the merchants maintained, the colony would meet
with decay.
In the same year of 1770, another petition found its way to London. The
wealthier merchants and Seigniors decided to finally and formally request the
reinstitution of their French civil law. Making the case that exclusion from offices in
Quebec had been "painful and at the same time ... humiliating,"64 The Canadians
requested of the king a reconsideration. It was the Quebecois' contention that their
exclusion from public office simply because of their religion "seems to have made of us
a reprobate nation." The efforts of Governors Murray and Carleton empowered the
Canadians to finally ask London for the direct restoration of their laws. As Oullet
contends, both governors were able to effectively ride the line between French
Canadian interests and British racial legislation to "perpetuate Quebec's traditional
society in opposition to the 'mercantile spirit.'" 65
Even before Carleton's persuasiveness was able to burrow its way into
Parliament's decision-making process, there were other influences at work. In 1766, in
his Considerations on the Expediency of Procuring an Act of Parliament for the
Settlement of the Province of Quebec, Baron Maseres, Attorney General of the
Province of Quebec stated his opinions on many different facets of the governing of the
colony. Among the more controversial topics that Maseres addressed was the question

Luedtke 33

of an assembly. Maseres declared if an assembly was to be erected with no Canadians
being allowed to sit or vote "till they have subscribed the declaration against Popery, it
would amount to an exclusion of all the Canadians." Maseres continued by stating "An
assembly so constituted, might pretend to be a representative of the people there, but in
truth it would be" comprised solely of the 600 British merchants in Quebec, "and an
instrument in their domineering over the 90,000 French." Maseres then asked whether
such an assembly could be "likely to produce harmony and friendship between the two
nations?" He answered with "Surely it must have a contrary effect." 66
Later in his Considerations, Maseres played devil's advocate. He noted the
danger inherent in admitting to the Quebecois the power and freedom of representative
government. Maseres declared the Quebecois to be "Bigotted ... to the Popish
religion ... and hitherto prejudiced against the laws and customs of England." As such,
Maseres contended the Quebecois would be likely to "quarrel with the governor an
council, or with the English members of the assembly." Lastly, Maseres added the
Quebecois "are almost universally ignorant of the English language, so as to be
absolutely incapable of debating in it." So, while Maseres noted the civil injustice an
English assembly in Quebec would create, he realized that opening up the assembly to
French members could not be an answer. Thus, the only logical solution could be the
institution of the oligarchy Murray and Carleton had been arguing for. 67
By 1770, Parliament was not only listening to arguments for a change in the
governing of Quebec, the legislators were in discussion. Isaac Barre asserted to the
House of Commons on 7 December 1770 that Quebec "has been exceedingly ill used.
It has been neglected." Barre challenged Parliament to rethink their Canadian policies
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from a different viewpoint. He asked, "has any measure been taken, to please those
new subjects, that you should have touched with delicacy? Have you tendered it to
them, with a wise and prudent hand?" Barre concluded by advising his fellow legislators
to enable the Quebecois to take ownership and pride over their governing, and only
then could they truly become valuable British subjects. 68 Barre, a retired soldier who
was present at the capitulation of Quebec was voicing a "common concern" over the
Jack of a policy resolution on the status of QuebecH9
The year 1770 marked a watershed in Quebec's administration. Carleton
travelled to London in order to lobby for the French Canadian interests. While it was
easy for debaters in London to push aside correspondence from Murray and Carleton
regarding the state of affairs in Quebec, to directly ignore Carleton's statements face-toface would prove infinitely more difficult. The Reports of the Board of Trade from 1770
to 1773 provide ample documentation of the growing debate, particularly on the issues
of Quebec's assembly and French civil law. While these reports differed in detail,
progress was clearly evident, as they all seemed to agree in one way or another for the
preservation of "some Canadian Jaw."70
The years following 1770 saw the debates in Parliament further solidify. By
1773, the decision was more or Jess finalized. During that year both the English
merchants in Quebec and the Canadians each sent in one final petition, "the English
asking an Assembly and the Canadians their 'ancient Jaws, privileges, and customs,'
and both asking that the province be extended to its former boundaries." 71 In the
Canadian petition, signed by "Les Canadiens Vrais Patriotes," the French acquiesced to
an acceptance of an assembly on the conditions that it be comprised of both "old and
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new subjects," and that "the boundary of the province should be extended in order to
favour trade."72 Though the actual author is anonymous, the most-likely author of this
Canadian petition was Secretary to the Governor of Quebec Frangois-Joseph Cugnet.
Cugnet frequently acted as the voice of the Canadians, and referred to himself as
"Le Canadien Patriote." 73
Neatby credits these two petitions of 1773 as resulting in the meeting of
"committees of English and Canadian merchants ... to prepare a joint petition." 74 In a
letter to Maseres, which accompanied the joint petition, the English committee stated "It
is now the general opinion of the people (French & English) that an Assembly would be
of the utmost advantage to the Colony, tho' they cannot agree as to the Constitution of
it." 75 This joint initiative established a precedent of cooperation and serious concern for
the future in the colony of Quebec that transcended the existing racial power struggle.
The inhabitants of Quebec, both French and English were ready to be taken seriously
by Parliament. If Carleton needed an extra push to sway the legislators in London, this
petition was it.
In 1773, amid this cooperative revolution, three proposals for how to govern the
Quebecois were being considered, one previously referenced by Thurlow, another by
Advocate General Marriott, and the last by Solicitor General Wedderburn. Of the three,
which all made compelling cases, it was Wedderburn's that was instrumental in
Parliament's writing of the Quebec Act. Wedderburn's argument that "The safety of the
state can be the only just motive for imposing any restraint upon men on account of
their religious tenets" was very difficult to refute. While Carleton is commonly credited
as the engineer of the Quebec Act, Philip Lawson reminds us "the labours of the
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craftsmen such as Wedderburn now require acknowledgement and recognition." 76 In a
most influential argument for the freedom of religion, Wedderburn contended that the
state has more to fear from the restriction of religion than the toleration of it. Asserting,
"there is no instance of any state that has been overturned by toleration," Wedderburn
reminded the legislators that the Quebecois were passive British subjects, and no
longer a foreign threat. Wedderburn concluded by stating, "True policy dictates then
that the inhabitants of Canada should be permitted freely to profess the worship of their
religion; and it follows of course, that the ministers of that worship should be protected
and a maintenance secured for them.'' 77
Thanks to the efforts of proponents such as Wedderburn and Carleton, by the
end of 1773, the groundwork of the Quebec Act had been successfully laid. All that
remained was the passing of the actual legislature. The timing, however, could not
have been more problematic. Parliament had committed to taking action on Quebec's
governance in the fall of 1773, but the Boston Tea Party logically took precedence the
following spring. The passing of the Quebec Act was delayed, which led to the
controversial sequence of events that came to be known as the Coercive Acts. 78
Regardless of historical interpretations, the truth is that Parliament had been making
assurances of Quebec's governmental overhaul since early in 1773.
The proposed drafts of the Quebec Bill resulted in a yearlong debate in
Parliament. Throughout the discussion, the "most contentious issues were the use of
Canadian civil law and the refusal of an assembly.'' 79 The topics of Catholic tolerance
and the proposed boundary extension found their way into the hot seat as well. In the
debates, Great Britain's Prime Minister Lord North took the rhetorical helm; he is quoted
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as stating the purpose of the bill was "undoubtedly to give a legislature to that country ...
but can a better legislation be given than that of a governor and council?" North added
"the best way to establish the happiness of the inhabitants is to give them their own
laws.'' 80
While many in Parliament agreed with Lord North there were those who clung to
the opposing arguments. Such opponents touted the principles of English law, and
preached against the legalization of Catholicism, a concept very fervently fought since
the Glorious Revolution of 1688. One such opponent, Colonel Barre responded by
declaring the Bill "as bad in itself." Barre explained that he foresaw "it will not contribute
to the peace of the country for which it is intended; and that it carries in its breast
something ... dangerous to ... our other colonies." Renowned Whig and vocal advocate
of representative government Edmund Burke stood in staunch defiance of the proposed
Quebec Bill. Burke vehemently declared he would never give his "vote for establishing
the French law," and that he "should be sorry to see his Majesty a despotic governor."
Burke asks "am I sure that this despotism is not meant to lead to universal despotism?
When that country cannot be governed as a free country, I question whether this can."
Burke's contention was that the absence of representative government in Quebec was
absolutely an indication of despotism. Burke maintained that if the British administration
were to allow such a form of government to exist in one of its colonies, the door would
be opened for the spread of further "despotism" throughout the British Empire. 81
Arguing against French civil law, Chief Justice Hey maintained that the
Canadians as a whole would have been better off under English civil law. Stating while
the "pride of a few haughty seigneurs may perhaps revolt at the Idea of submitting their
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conduct to the decision of a Rank of men they are too apt upon all occasions to
despise," Hey argued that without an assembly, the other classes of Canadians
received no governmental representation. 82 Voiced concerns over the well being of the
lower classes of Quebecois such as Hey's rarely appear in the archives. This lack of a
Canadian voice can be attributed to the fact that few Quebecois were literate, and that
of "the clergy, especially, many whose views would have been interesting may have
thought it wiser not to express them in writing 83
After a tremendous amount of debating in the House of Commons, the Quebec
Act was pushed through Parliament on 13 June 1774. In its final form, the Quebec Act
addressed every issue that was under debate. First, the territorial expansion of the
Province of Quebec was defined. In very concise terms, the act laid out the new
boundaries for Quebec, essentially establishing the colony to include the lands that the
Royal Proclamation had deemed Indian reserves in 1763. From the east, this included
all land from the Atlantic, down St. Lawrence and through its estuaries down the Ohio
River, as far west as the Mississippi River, and all the land north of that "to the Southern
Boundary of the Territory granted to the Merchants Adventurers of England, trading to
Hudson's Bay." The act did, however, ensure the provision that "nothing herein
contained, relative to the Boundary of the Province of Quebec, shall in anywise affect
the Boundaries of any other Colony;" meaning Parliament realized the act would offend
the other colonies, and was hoping to limit the outrage. 84
The second issue covered by the Quebec Act was the reestablishment of French
civil law as had been "protected, governed, and ordered, for a long Series of Years,
from the First Establishment of the said Province of Canada." Such a concession
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reinstated a legal system the Quebecois could understand, and one that could be
practiced in the language that they spoke. The Canadians no longer needed to fear
trials where the jury was comprised solely of the English merchant minority. Rather, the
Quebecois could enjoy the liberty of a jury of their peers. 85
The third issue was the revoking of the "Oath required by the said Statute passed
in the First Year of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth." Such a provision ensured the free
practice of the Catholic religion in Quebec. This was a precedent not seen in the British
Empire since the end of the sixteenth century. The only condition stated was that the
quebecois "may have, hold, and enjoy, the free Exercise of the Religion of the Church of
Rome, subject to the King's Supremecy." A new oath of loyalty to King George was
required by all Quebecois, but since it made no mention whatsoever of religious faith,
the compromise was welcomed.
The fourth issue addressed by the Quebec Act legalized the Catholic Church's
ability to collect tithes. It stated, "that the Clergy of the said Church may hold, receive,
and enjoy, their accustomed Dues and Rights." While the act guaranteed the right to
collect tithes, it did maintain the condition "with respect to such Persons only as shall
profess the said Religion." Again, a precedent was set in the British Empire of religious
tolerance not seen for almost two hundred years.
The fifth issue pertained to property and civil rights. The act clearly stated, that
"all His Majesty's Canadian Subjects, within the Province of Quebec ... may also hold
and enjoy their Property and Possessions ... and all other their Civil Rights." The act
later added, that "in all Matters of Controversy, relative to Property and Civil Rights,
Resort shall be had to the Laws of Canada, as the Rule for the Decision." The provision

Luedtke 40

to this section of the act did state, however, "nothing in this Act contained shall extend,
or be construed to extend, to any Lands that have been granted by His Majesty, His
Heirs and Successors, to be holden in free and common Soccage."
While the Quebec Act effectively reinstated French civil law, it left English
criminal law intact. The act declared, "the Certainty and Lenity of the Criminal Law of
England, and the Benefits and Advantages resulting from the Use of it, have been
sensibly felt by the Inhabitants, from an Experience of more than Nine Years." The act
also maintained for the "Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or Commander in Chief for the
Time being," the ability to amend and alter the established English mode of criminal law,
should unforeseen circumstances arise.
The last major issue of the debates of the Quebec Bill was that of the general
assembly. The Quebec Act, in a last concession to Carleton and the Canadian
petitioners specifically stated "it is at present inexpedient to call an Assembly." In
regards to the governing of the colony, the Quebec Act again set a precedent by calling
only for the Governor and his council. The act did offer the stipulation that "nothing in
this Act contained shall extend to authorise or impower the said legislative Council to lay
any Taxes or Duties within the said Province." In another provision, the act forbid
ordinances touching on religion without "His Majesty's Approbation."
The Quebec Act essentially righted the political wrongs of the Royal
Proclamation. Parliament's idea to model Quebec's government on Britain's other
successful North American colonies made perfect sense. Had only the level of British
immigration to Quebec met expectations, the population balance would have allowed for
a synchronous conversion. However, as power-hungry merchants seemed the only
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British willing to transplant to the frigid colony, French Canadians were in no danger of
losing the population battle. With the Quebecois effectively excluded from
governmental and judicial representation, the very meaning of the English constitution
was flipped on its head. 86
Because the Quebec Act was not enacted until 1 May 1775, the eleven months
after its passing saw a raft of petitions and appeals for its rescindment. Opposition to
the act differed greatly in form. Most notably, Protestants, who like Burke carried the
banner of the Glorious Revolution, saw the religious concessions made by the Quebec
Act as an invitation to Catholic despotism. Supporters of the Act were labeled as
"enemies to liberty," and blacklisted in the London Evening Post87 In Quebec,
response to the act seemed somewhat muted, but equally varied. The seigniors
celebrated, having emerged victorious, while the English merchants continued to call for
repeal. In a letter that was drafted three times, once for each of the King, the House of
Lords, and the House of Commons, the merchants declared the Quebec Act as
depriving them their protection by the "English Laws so universally admired for their
Wisdom and Lenity." Rather, the merchants state "the Laws of CANADA are to be
introduced to which we are utter Strangers." Chief among the merchants' complaints
was the loss of Habeas Corpus, which they claim subjected them to "arbitrary Fines and
Imprisonment at the Will of the Governor and Council who may at Pleasure render the
Certainty of the Criminal Laws of no Effect by the great Power that is granted to them of
making Alterations in the same." 88
The British merchant response to the Quebec Act was to be expected. However,
it was the intent of British legislators to win over the Canadians. After the passing of the
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act, Carleton reported in a letter to the Earl of Dartmouth "I have had the Satisfaction of
finding His Majesty's Canadian Subjects impressed with the strongest sense of The
King's great Goodness towards them." Carleton went on to assure that "All Ranks of
People amongst them vied with each other in testifying their Gratitude and Respect, and
the Desire they have by every Mark of Duty and Submission to prove themselves not
undeserving of the Treatment they have met with," reassuring Parliament of the
legislative victory in Canada. 89
Despite any initial reactions the Quebecois might have had, the apparent victory
was almost instantly soured, as the year following the enactment would call for direct
action. Revolt broke out in New England, partly in direct response to the Quebec Act.
With it, the Quebecois' loyalty to the British crown was instantly tested. Carleton and
the political engine in Quebec fought feverishly to hold its newfound constituents as the
American Propaganda machine was now in full swing, and in 1775, winning over the
Quebecois was a chief ambition for both sides.
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Chapter 3> "Uniting with us in the defence of our common liberty" 90 : Why
the Americans chose to invade Canada, and why it failed.

The once formidable fortress of Ticonderoga, stationed on the south end of Lake
Champlain served as the gateway either north into the St. Lawrence or south down the
Hudson River, depending on which army controlled it. Prior to hostilities breaking out
between the British and the New Englanders in 1775, Ticonderoga was a shamble of a
fortress in the hands of the British. On 15 February 1767, Governor Carleton, upon
contemplating the possibility of a war on the continent urged Major General Gage to see
to the state of the "Forts of Crown Point, Ticonderoga, and Fort George," which Carleton
claimed were "in a very declining Condition, of which, I believe, Your Excellency is well
informed." Carleton used this communication to convey the notion that the defense of
the province was "not only expedient, but indispensably necessary for the Interest of
Great Britain, and His Majesty's Service." The danger Carleton perceived was of a
possible "Faction or Party" of men "not thoroughly bound to their Duty" who might rise
up in rebellion. 91 Carleton's premonition came true when, on 9 May 1775, Ethan Allen
along with about two hundred of his "Green Mountain Boys" took the fortress easily.
Allen is famously quoted as ordering the surrender of Ticonderoga "In the name of the
great Jehovah, and the Continental Congress." 92
From Ticonderoga, colonials, under the leadership of General Montgomery and
Colonel Benedict Arnold went on to take the strongholds of St. Jean, Crown Pointe, and
Montreal before marching to the doorstep of Quebec City. Canada had been invaded,
and the Canadians, who were still recovering from the French and Indian War fifteen
years earlier, were forced to choose sides. In the previous two chapters, I discussed
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the cultural and political distinctions between the various classes of Quebecois leading
up to the Invasion of Canada. The Quebecois, who had just benefitted from the passing
of the Quebec Act when war broke out were now being asked to join in a revolt against
the very imperial engine that had just conceded a great deal of liberty to them. This
chapter will build upon the analyses of the previous two chapters in order to illustrate
and comprehend the manners in which the various classes of Quebecois responded to
the Revolutionary War, especially to the Invasion of Canada in 1775. Integral to the
understanding of the varying Quebecois viewpoint, this chapter begins by analyzing the
actions of both the Continental Congress and the colonial armies in order to pinpoint the
various triggers of Canadian reactions throughout the early years of the Revolutionary
War.
On 17 September 1774, three months after the passing of the Quebec Act, the
Continental Congress met to discuss how best to respond to what they penned as the
"Intolerable Acts". Congress wound up putting forth a resolution denouncing those acts
of Parliament. The preamble of which stated:
If a boundless extent of continent, swarming with millions, will tamely submit to live,
move and have their being at the arbitrary will of a licentious minister, they basely
yield to voluntary slavery, and future generations shall load their memories with
incessant execrations.--On the other hand, if we arrest the hand which would
ransack our pockets, if we disarm the parricide which points the dagger to our
bosoms, if we nobly defeat that fatal edict which proclaims a power to frame laws for
us in all cases whatsoever, thereby entailing the endless and numberless curses of
slavery upon us, our heirs and their heirs forever; if we successfully resist that
unparalleled usurpation of unconstitutional power, whereby our capital is robbed of
the means of life; whereby the streets of Boston are thronged with military
executioners; whereby our coasts are lined and harbours crouded with ships of war;
whereby the charter of the colony, that sacred barrier against the encroachments of
tyranny, is mutilated and, in effect, annihilated; whereby a murderous law is framed
to shelter villains from the hands of justice; whereby the unalienable and inestimable
inheritance, which we derived from nature, the constitution of Britain, and the
privileges warranted to us in the charter of the province, is totally wrecked, annulled,
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and vacated, posterity will acknowledge that virtue which preserved them free and
happy; and while we enjoy the rewards and blessings of the faithful, the torrent of
panegyrists will roll our reputations to that latest period, when the streams of time
shall be absorbed in the abyss of eternity.

Clearly, the Continental Congress chose such carefully flourished language in order to
defend their treasonous intentions. The Continental Congress' resolution outlined the
various offenses Parliament was said to have committed toward the colonies including
the blocking of Boston Harbor and the altering of the Massachusetts charter.
Specifically among such offenses was listed "the late act of parliament for establishing
the Roman Catholic religion and the French laws in that extensive country, now called
Canada," which Congress claimed was "dangerous in an extreme degree to the
Protestant religion and to the civil rights and liberties of all America." There could be no
denying that the colonies were of the impression the Quebec Act was passed in direct
response to, and in punishment for the actions of the New England colonists. 93
John Jay interpreted the Quebec Act as a way for Britain to mold the colony of
Quebec into a weapon for use against the other Protestant colonies. By governing
Quebec in a manner "as that by being disunited from us, detached from our interests by
civil as well as religious prejudices," Jay argued that Parliament was bent on making the
colonists pay. Jay's statement contending the Quebecois were being primed as "fit
instruments in the hands of power to reduce the ancient, free Protestant colonies to the
same state of slavery with themselves," supported the well documented and common
notion that the Continental Congress perceived the Quebec Act as legislative
punishment. 94
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Ironically, after so much racially-charged political propaganda, the Continental
Congress came to the conclusion that they would do better to bring Quebec into the fold
as a fourteenth colony, rather than risk it remaining a part of Britain, and therefore a
stronghold from which to launch attacks on New England and New York. So it was that
the Congress composed its first letter to the inhabitants of Canada, urging an alliance
against the cruel subjugation, which they claimed was British imperial rule. The letter,
penned again by John Jay asked the Canadians to set aside their religious differences,
for, Jay proposed "we perceived the fate of the protestant and catholic colonies to be
strongly linked together," so Jay entreated the Canadians join the other colonies "in
resolving to be free, and in rejecting, with disdain, the fetters of slavery, however artfully
polished." Contrary to the Quebecois' understanding of the Quebec Act, Jay maintained
Parliament had established in Canada a "present form of government, or rather present
form of tyranny" in which the Quebecois "have nothing that you can call your own, and
all the fruits of your labour and industry may be taken from you, whenever an avaritious
governor and a rapacious council may incline to demand them." Jay pointed out that if
war did break out, the Quebecois would be called upon to fight anyways, so they might
as well fight for their liberty and freedom from oppression. 95
While it was eloquently persuasive, the letter did not have the effect that the
Continental Congress had hoped. This was due partly to the fact that the majority of
French Canadian habitants, who were Congress' best hope for sympathy in Quebec
could not read in the eighteenth century, and needed the letter read to them. Of course,
the letter could not sway the Quebecois seigniors or French merchants, all of whom had
finally just won their ten year political battle for the right to civil law and the freedom of
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their Catholic faith. Rather, Carleton was able to stir up the upper class and the clergy
into remaining loyal to the British crown, leaving the American rebels on their own.
What Carleton was not able to achieve, however, was enough support among the
Canadians to rally any sort of army capable of doing the American colonies any real
damage. 96
Long before the invasion, the Continental Congress did make other attempts at a
peaceful alliance with Quebec. The mindset and perception of the Quebecois was of
the upmost importance to both the British and the colonials, and so propaganda poured
in from both directions. In response to Carleton's initial report of the Canadian fervor for
the passing of the Quebec Act, the Earl of Dartmouth responded with some skepticism.
Dartmouth did proclaim a satisfaction that Carleton "found His Majesty's Canadian
Subjects impressed with a just Sense of His Majestys Goodness to them," and "with the
Regulations adopted for the future Government of the Colony." However, Dartmouth
warned that as Carleton remained "silent as to the Sentiments of His Majesty's Natural
born Subjects in Canada respecting the late Act," and thus that he was "not at liberty to
conclude that they entertain the same opinion of it." Dartmouth realized that Canadian
loyalty could not be taken for granted. The Quebecois might not be as fiery about the
notion of liberty as the New Englanders, but their ambiguous nature left him unfulfilled.
Dartmouth concluded to Carleton that after the Quebec Act had been in effect long
enough for the Canadian subjects to understand its true intentions, "prejudices which
popular Clamour has excited, will cease, and that His Majesty's Subjects of every
description will see and be convinced of the Equity and good Policy of the Bill."
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Dartmouth held high hopes of the Quebec Act's eventual success, but was keenly
aware of the tensions of the immediate situation. 97
While British legislators were preoccupied with the Quebecois' allegiance, in
September of 1774, General Gage ordered <!II regular British troops stationed in
Canada to be dispatched to Boston in anticipation of the building conflict. This left
Carleton in a very vulnerable position, having little in the way of an army to protect
against the coming continentals. By May of 1775, the Continental Congress had made
up its mind. Quebec needed to join the rebellion, either willfully or by coercion. More
attempts at a peaceful solution were made, but the Congress had grown impatient. 98
After the taking of Fort Ticonderoga, Colonel Ethan Allen crossed the Canadian
border on multiple missions to build a rapport with the Quebecois. Allen's hope was to
build sympathy for the American cause. In his journal of captivity, Allen spoke of his
orders to advance into Canada with "letters to the Canadians, and to let them know, that
the design of the army was only against the English garrisons, and not the country, their
liberties, or religion."99 In the first such letter, Allen insisted that war between the
colonies and Britain was inevitable, but he implored, was "it necessary that the
Canadians and the inhabitants of the English colonies should butcher each other? God
forbid. There are no controversies subsisting between us." In the letter, Allen
recounted an occurrence of an American reconnoitering party being fired upon by a host
of Canadians. Allen insisted that "special orders from the colonies were, to befriend and
protect you ... so that if you desire their friendship, you are invited to embrace it for
nothing can be more undesirable ... than a war with their fellow subjects, the
Canadians." 100 Such a correspondence was an excellent illustration of the caution that

Luedtke 49

was taken toward Canadian relations at the time. A war with Canada was truly in no
one's best interest, but ultimately, Congress could not allow the British an easy route
into the heart of the colonies.
The Canadians, which Allen and other colonial emissaries came into contact with
were described for the most part as being possessed of "politeness and civility," such as
those "poor Canadian peasants" that Isaac Senter and Benedict Arnold encountered
once they began to close in on Quebec City. 101 Of course, these particular peasants
were located on the fringe of the colony and as such were less under the heavy
influence of the Canadian clergy. Throughout the colony of Quebec, one of the most
common problems the Americans encountered was the reliance the Canadian habitants
had upon the clergy and seigniors to read and interpret Congress' letters. This naturally
meant, as Canadian Prudent Lajeunesse explained to Congress, that all of their letters
would be explained "in a way which would prejudice their hearers against the
Americans." Lajeunesse informed Congress "The same interpreters had read articles
from New York royalist newspapers affirming that the rebels meant to suppress the
Catholic religion and to appropriate the property of Canadians." Thus the letters were
only an effective means of communication with Canada's literate classes, all of which
had proven to be the unswayable. 102
The only responders to Congress' letters provided little or no solace. In reply to
those letters, four merchants from Montreal offered their empathy, but could not provide
any sort of physical support. The merchants replied they were "more the objects of pity
and compassion that yourselves, who are now suffering under the heavy hand of
power." The merchants declared themselves forced to remain mute under the
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"unlimited power of the governor," who would strike "all opposition dead," forcing the
Quebecois to "groan in silence, and dream of lettres de cachet, confiscations, and
imprisonments; offering up their fervent prayers" to the cause of the united colonies.
The merchants continue by lamenting the fact that "the British inhabitants of this widely
extended province, united in their sentiments ... have neither numbers nor wealth
sufficient to do ... any essential service." The British merchants insisted that "the bulk of
the people, both English and Canadians" wished the best for the rebellion, believing that
if the united colonies succeeded, then Quebec would be ceded as well. However, the
merchants maintained they could do no good voicing or acting upon any support. They
declared themselves "being of no more estimation in the political machine, than the
sailors are, in shaping the course or working the ship in which they sail." 103
Though the merchants professed their hopes for the rebellion's success, they
assured the Congress the noblesse was not of the same opinion. Declaring the
Canadian gentry as having no notion "of liberty, or law," the merchants claimed "the preeminence given to their religion, together with a participation of honors and offices in
common with the English, not only flatters their natural pride and vanity, but is regarded
by them, as a mark of distinction and merit, that lays open their way to fortune." Lastly,
the merchants remarked that "it may not be amiss just to hint, that the idea the
Canadians seem to have of this colony, at present is, that it is to be a French
government, holding under the crown of Great Britain; from which they mean to exclude
every Englishman, save the governor and lieutenant governor." The merchants, in
attempt to convey their complete empathy to the united colonies concluded the letter by
stating "we heartily wish our abilities to serve you were equal to our wills, and pray
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Heaven to prosper your generous purpose; and are, with the utmost consideration and
feeling for your distresses." Furthermore, in the postscript, the merchants begged, "that
this letter may not be now published, for fear of bad consequences to the subscribers."
Congress realized its challenge would be to peaceably win over the illiterate habitants,
who comprised the majority of Quebec's population. Because Congress could find no
way of reaching out to the bulk of the Canadian peasantry, it saw no other choice but
invasion. 104
When news that Montgomery was marching on Montreal had spread, Carleton,
with the aid of his loyal supporters including prominent merchant Pierre Guy called up a
militia. As Guy proclaimed, "the gentry, the clergy, and most of the bourgeois" exhibited
"the greatest zeal and fidelity to the King's service, and exerted their best endeavours to
reclaim their infatuated countrymen," 105 however, the habitants did not rally to the call of
their militia officers. Instead began a pattern in Quebec of the habitants either
remaining neutral and abstaining from the fighting altogether or selling their allegiance
to the highest bidder. In a letter to Dartmouth, William Tryon, the former governor of
New York complained that Canadian habitants would march for Carleton only "on
condition that a large enough troop of British soldiers could be assembled to support
them if they were repulsed." Tryon implied the habitants would simply remain neutral
otherwise. 106
Hector Cramahe, President of the Council of Quebec, and Civil Secretary to
Carleton exclaimed in a letter to Dartmouth that "No Means have been left untried to
bring the Canadian Peasantry to a Sense of their Duty, and engage them to take up
arms in Defence of the Province, but all to no Purpose." Cramahe was instrumental in
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the Battle of Quebec in 1775 as he readied the city's defenses while Carleton retreated
from Montreal. As such, Cramahe was able to assess the levels of loyalty and
discipline held by the varying classes of Quebecois on the eve of the attack. Cramahe
remarked "Justice must be done to the Gentry, Clergy, and most of the Bourgeosie, that
they have shewen the greatest Zeal and Fidelity to the King's Service, and exerted their
best Endeavours to reclaim their infatuated Countrymen." Cramahe's final assessment
to Dartmouth was that "some Troops, and a Ship of War or two, would in all likelihood
have prevented this general Defection." 107
Carleton similarly complained of the habitants' lack of patriotic duty. In a letter to
General Gage, Carleton remarked of the habitants "ever since the Civil Authority has
been introduced into the Province, the Government of it has hung so loose, and
retained so little Power, they have in a Manner emancipated themselves." Carleton
warned that though the Canadians were conceded a great deal in the Quebec Act, only
time and strict management could extract from them the obedience and discipline that
was expected from British citizens, especially during a time of strife or war. Carleton
added that the Canadians had just begun the recovery process from the last war that
tore their lives apart, and that they shouldn't be expected to be "pleased at being
suddenly, and without Preparation embodied into a Militia, and marched from their
Families, Lands, and Habitations to ... all the Horrors of War, which they have already
experienced." 108
Carleton recognized and understood the common impatience suffered by the
typical Briton, especially with the situation in the colonies turning hostile, but he
cautioned "the Act is no more than the Foundation of future Establishments," and that
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as such "the new Commissions and Instructions, expected out, are not yet arrived, and
that the Dissolution of the present Constitution, if it deserves the Name, and
Establishment of the new one, are still at some Distance." Carleton knew that by
gaining the trust and allegiance of the noblesse, the clergy, and the French merchants it
was only a matter of time. The peasants were unaccustomed to leadership. Their
feudal upbringing had prepared them to exhibit the least amount of loyalty necessary to
appease their seigniors. Carleton's long-term plan called for a deep rebirth of society
from the top down. Carleton quipped to Gage, "had the present Settlement taken Place,
when first recommended, it would not have roused the Jealousy of the other Colonies,
and had the appearance of more disinterested Favor to the Canadians." 109
In any case, not enough time had elapsed for Carleton's plan of allegiance to be
realized. Simply put, the habitants were torn. Many Americans saw this lack of patriotic
zeal as a golden opportunity, and so action was called for. In a letter forwarded to
Major General Wooster in June of 1775, which comprised of notes from the New York
Congress, various accounts of the state of Montreal were conveyed. Among these, one
forwarded by Connecticut Governor, Jonathan Trumbull reported that in Montreal, a
"number of Canadians have expected our army there, and are impatient of our delay,
being determined to join us as soon as sufficient force appears to support them." The
report continues by declaring "that Gov. Carleton, by every art, can raise no more than
twenty Canadians of the noblesse: that he threatens to burn Montreal, if the merchants
won't defend the city, in case of an attack." The Continental Congress wasted no time
in launching their attack.

110
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After being informed of the aggressive acts of Arnold and Allen on the fortresses
of Ticonderoga and St. John's, Carleton professed in a letter to Dartmouth the
underwhelming response of the Quebecois when asked to rally to their country's
defense. Carleton referred to his "little Force" as being comprised mostly of the nobles
who were meant to lead. The letter stated that after being ordered to call the habitants
and Indians to the militia, "the Gentlemen testified great Zeal," but "neither their
Entreaties or their Example could prevail upon the People." Rather, Carleton lamented
only "a few of the Gentry, consisting principally of the Youth ... formed a small Corps of
Volunteers," while "the Indians shewed as much Backwardness as the Canadian
Peasantry. "111
The fact that Montgomery and Arnold were able to waltz right up to the walls of
Quebec, ransacking all posts and fortresses along the way was evidence enough that
Canada was in no state to participate in a war. Had Arnold and Montgomery not felt
pressured into attacking when they did, mostly due to the fact that a great many of their
soldiers' enlistments were soon to be expired, the battle of Quebec might have had a
much different outcome. When Arnold's army, which marched up the Kennebec River
using an incredibly inaccurate map and poorly crafted boats finally managed to reach
Quebec City in November of 1775, it was at less than a quarter strength. Arnold's army
suffered massive losses to disease and desertion during the grueling march. Isaac
Senter, a physician and surgeon dispatched with Arnold's unit commented on the
abhorrent conditions through which they marched. Senter described the troops' morale
as having reached "the zenith of distress." According to Senter, as "several had been
entirely destitute of either meat or bread," the troops had reverted to consuming "the
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shaving soap, pomatum, and even the lip salve, leather of their shoes, cartridge boxes,
&c .. " In any case, by the time it reached Quebec City, Arnold's force was not prepared
for a full on attack, especially during a harsh winter storm. 112
Montgomery's army fared much better than Arnold's en route to Quebec. Aside
from the losses of Allen's advance troop of Green Mountain Boys and scouts,
Montgomery's force was mostly intact by the time it reached Quebec City. In fact, as
Montgomery's army succeeded in sacking fort after fort, it picked up steam in the form
of Canadian volunteers. When Montgomery took Montreal, he had some 500
Canadians in his ranks. Every American success was a political debacle for Carleton.
The habitants, who were on the fence as it was, found very little motivation to join the
militia; the Canadian peasants who did not participate in Montgomery's march into the
heart of the colony tended to sway instead toward neutrality. This basically ensured an
open road to Quebec City. 113
Carleton, realizing the futility of facing off against Montgomery's superior force
abandoned Montreal without a fight. Trois Rivieres followed suit, and Carleton instead
focused all his efforts on a last stand at Quebec City. While Montgomery's army was
significantly larger than the force that defended Quebec City, what was lacking was
artillery. Arnold's shamble of an army could not help in that department; he was lucky to
have successfully completed his march up the Kennebec at all. When the armies of
Montgomery and Arnold finally converged outside the walls of Quebec in December,
Montgomery was faced with a conundrum; many of his enlistments expired at the end of
the year, and he knew there was no hope in persuading them to stay on through the
harsh winter without first winning over the heart of Quebec. So it was that Montgomery
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and Arnold foolishly attacked the great fortress city in the middle of a harsh winter storm
on 30 December 1775. In the fray, Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded. The
American forces suffered heavy casualties, but Arnold refused to let up. Instead he
held a siege on Quebec City that lasted until British reinforcements arrived the following
May. During the long siege, Arnold was not only unsuccessful at keeping his own army
intact (they suffered heavy losses to small pox and desertion), but as time elapsed; his
ability to maintain any sort of Canadian allegiance dwindled. This is not to say the
habitants rushed to the banner of Carleton, though some did, rather, the bulk of the
Canadian peasantry reverted to its neutral state. 114
The invasion of Canada was a failure, but not because the Canadians rallied
to the defense of their capitol. In August of 1775, William Hey, Chief Justice of Quebec
wrote to the Lord Chancellor on the state of Canadian affairs. In his report, Hey
remarked that his opinion of the Quebecois habitants had changed substantially. Hey
admitted he was once a chief supporter of the quebecois citizenry, having professed
their "Loyalty, obedience & Gratitude, of their habitual submission to Government, &
their decent civil & respectful I demeanour to those who had the conduct of it." However,
after witnessing the turn of events leading up to the Battle of Quebec, Hey changed
drastically changed his disposition. Hey remarked that while "time and accident have
evinced that they were obedient only because they were afraid to be otherwise," the
withdrawal of the British troops in Quebec removed that fear, and with it was "gone all
the good disposition that we have so often and steadily avowed in their names &
promised for them in ages to come." Hey, like Carleton did concede that timing was a
factor, and that "temperate management and gentle methods of persuasion and
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instruction may yet bring them to a sense of their duty & indeed their interest."
Unfortunately for Britain, that time could not be accelerated in order to rouse the sense
of patriotic duty in the habitants that was necessary for the defense of the country.
Fortunately for Britain, it did not matter in the long run, as the invaders defeated
themselves, and Quebec was allowed the precious time it needed in order to convert
the Quebecois into the British subjects they were promised to be.
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Conclusion

Parliament's idea to model Quebec's government on Britain's other successful
North American colonies made perfect sense. Had only the level of British immigration
to Quebec met expectations, the population balance would have allowed for a
synchronous conversion. However, as power-hungry merchants seemed the only
British willing to transplant to the frigid colony, French Canadians were in no danger of
losing the population battle. With the Quebecois effectively excluded from
governmental and judicial representation, the very meaning of the English constitution
was flipped on its head.
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In retrospect, Attorney General of Quebec, Baron Francis Maseres observed in
1766 that while an assembly "might pretend to be a representative of the people there ...
in truth it would be a representative of only the 600 new English settlers," as opposed to
the 90,000 French Canadians.
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When the Royal Proclamation was conceived, it was

thought to "attract English settlers in such numbers as would ultimately absorb the
Canadians." 117 This doesn't mean the Proclamation was designed with the intention to
subjugate the Quebecois. Rather legislators believed a major influx of British interests
in Quebec would lead to an Anglo-Saxon majority, therefore justifying the
Proclamation's inherent racial discrimination.
Governor Murray dedicated a great deal of his administration to the protecting of
Quebecois' rights, but in the end, such efforts resulted only in his removal from office.
Carleton picked up where Murray left off, and continued to work towards the restoration
of French Canadian society in opposition to the traditional English mercantilism that had
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been spread all over the globe. While ultimately, the efforts of Murray and Carleton
prevailed in the form of the Quebec Act, the timing of its passing conveniently aligned
with the many other actions of Parliament, which drove the united colonies to rebel.
Carleton was able to hold Quebec together during the Revolution, but the Quebecois'
status as British citizens was put to the test.
With the aid of retrospect, Carleton remarked in a letter to Lord George Sackville
Germain, Dartmouth's successor as Colonial Secretary in regards to "the Canadians, I
think there is nothing to fear from them, while we are in a state of prosperity, and
nothing to hope for when in distress." Carleton found himself stuck in a political vise.
He was forced to fend off a hostile invasion with no army of regulars. Rather, he was
asked to defend his province with a militia comprised of newly conquered subjects, who,
though they were conceded a great deal by contemporary standards, were themselves
struggling to stay afloat, and weary to choose a side for fear it might turn out to be the
losing one. Fortunately, in the end, Carleton's faction was able to outlast the siege at
Quebec City, and his Canadian subjects were not further tested for loyalty in combat.
There is no telling what the result might have been. Carleton's remarks to Germain
summed the situation up nicely when he declared "I speak for the People at large; there
are among them those who are guided by Sentiments of honour, but the multitude is
influenced only by hopes of gain, or fear of punishment," and the year of 1775 was a
very uncertain time to be a Canadian, not knowing which side would prevail. 118
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